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COPYRIGHT OFFICE REGISTRATION OF INDUSTRIAL
DESIGNS
Dorothy Schradert
I.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

A.

Statutory Provisions

Under section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection
exists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.'" Section 102 further places works of authorship into seven categories, one of which includes works of art known as "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works.,,2 The statutory definition of pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works embodies the language of the Copyright Office's former
work of art regulations, issued in 19563 and 1959. 4 The Copyright Act now
provides that:
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and
applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps,
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 5
Moreover, a useful article is defined in section 101 of the Act as "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.' ,,6
Thus, the design of an article having any useful function can be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if it incorporates artistic
features that "can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.,,7 Consequently, only
those articles which contain artistic features separate from the function of
the article will enjoy copyright protection.
t A.B., 1960, University of Southern California; J.D., 1963, Harvard University. AssociI.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

ate Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs, United States Copyright Office.
17 U.S.c. § 102(a) (1988).
[d. § 102(a)(5).
37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1956).
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959).
17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
[d. (emphasis added).
[d.
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Continuity of the Copyrightability Standard from the Act of J909 to the
Act of 1976

Clear legislative history supports the view that the copyrightability
standard applied under the old Copyright Act, 8 and clarified by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,9 is the same
standard embodied in the new Copyright Act. The House Report concerning the 1976 Copyright Act clearly expresses this point and provides a helpful explanation of the principal of separability in determining whether a
utilitarian article contains copyrightable subject matter. 10 The Report
states: "The Committee has added language to the definition of 'pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works' in an effort to make clearer the distinction
between works of applied art protectable under the bill and industrial
designs not subject to copyright protection." 11 This distinction is seen in
the second part of the amendment which reads as follows:
the design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work, only if, and only to the extent that
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 12
The above language articulates what is referred to as the principle of
separability. In applying this principle, a two-dimensional "painting, drawing or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is
printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper,
containers and the Iike."13 However, the shape of an industrial product is
protected, only if some pictorial, graphic, or sculptural element can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that product. Furthermore, if any such elements are identified, the copyright extends only to that
element and not to the utilitarian article as a whole. 14
II.

JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND

Section 5(g) of the Copyright Act of 1909 15 specified that works of art
were eligible for copyright. The Copyright Office's regulations pursuant to
the 1909 Act provided: "Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character are not subject to copyright registration, even if
8. Title 17 US.c., in effect until December 31, 1977.
9. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 US. 908 (1978).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1976 US. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5663.
II. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
12. rd.; see also 17 US.c. § 101 (1988).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
14. For a full explanation of the principle of separability, see id. at 54-58.
15. Act of Mar. 4,1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075, 1077.
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artistically made or ornamented."16 With only minor modification, this
regulation remained in effect until 1948.
The Copyright Office's regulations, which were adopted in 1948 and
remained in effect on December 31, 1977, defined "works of art" in the following manner: "This class includes published or unpublished works of
artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilization aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware,
and tapestries, as well as works belonging.to the fine arts, such as paintings,
drawings, and sculpture." 17 This general definition excluded the utilitarian
aspects of a work from copyright protection as a work of art. Also, it did
not establish a precise test for differentiating protected artistic designs from
nonprotected designs.
The Copyright Office's works of art regulation was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein. 18 The Court held that a work of art did not
lose its rightto protection under copyright law when it was incorporated in a
utilitarian article and reproduced in a substantial number of copies. Moreover, the potential availability of design patent protection did not foreclose
copyright protection.
Although the Court upheld the Copyright Office's regulation, Mazer
was interpreted by some as opening the door of copyright law to an even
broader class of applied designs-those where function and aesthetic
appearance tend to merge. In reaction to pressure for increased protection
of designs, the Copyright Office issued a clarifying regulation in which the
separability test was explicitly stated for the first time. 19 The separability
test, now codified in the current Copyright Act, was expressed in the Copyright Office's regulations as follows:

If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact
that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it
as a work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article
incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are
capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features
will be eligible for registration. 20
The separability test was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer. 21 In Esquire,
the court considered whether the Register of Copyrights, in refusing to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

u.s.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE. RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO
COPYRIGHT § 12(g) (1909). reprinted in A. WElL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 625

(1917).
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1948).
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959).
Id.
591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1978).
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register designs of outdoor lighting fixtures, had adopted a permissible
interpretation of the regulation. The court agreed with the Register's view
that Congress, in enacting the Copyright Act of 1909, adopted a policy
against copyrighting industrial designs. The Register's reading of section
202.1O(c) was characterized by the Esquire court as "a reasonable and wellsupported interpretation.'>22 The interpretation was held to reflect both
administrative expertise and consistent application. 23
. More recently, the Eleventh Circuit applied the separability test and
agreed with ·the Copyright Office that the design of a wire wheel cover did
not qualify as a work of art since there were no artistic features that could
exist independently of the useful article. 24
Two district court cases also sharply iIlustrate the dividing line
between utilitarian objects entitled to copyright protection and those objects
not entitled. In Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft CO.,25 copyright was accorded
only to the design encasing a pencil sharpener and not to the entire useful
article. The court in Silvercraft held: "It is crucial at this point to make clear
that the copyrighted article is the simulation of an antique telephone, not the
pencil sharpener inside, and not the combination of the twO.,,26 Consequently, the overall shape of an attractive, useful article-a pencil sharpener-could not be copyrighted. In SCOA Industries. Inc. v. Farnolare.
Inc.,27 the Copyright Office refused to register a claim to copyright a series
of wavy lines produced on a shoe sole because they were not separable. The
court held there was no infringement where a competitor merely incorporated those wavy lines into its shoe soles. 28
In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl. Inc.,29 the Second Circuit
considered the question of whether handcrafted belt buckles containing
sculptured designs were copyrightable. As the court admitted, the issue
presented was "on a razor's edge of copyright law,"3o The Kieselstein-Cord
court applied the separability test differently from any other court. The
court recognized that the belt buckles were registered by the Copyright
Office as jewelry, and the Office has considered artistic jewelry to be copyrightable as works of art since 1948. 31 In holding the belt buckles to be
copyrightable, the Kieselstein-Cord court found the design formed on the surface of the buckles to be a conceptually separate design. 32 In summation,
22. [d. at 800.
23. [d. at 804-05.
24. Norris Indus .• Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.• 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.). cert.
denied. 464 U.S. 81 8 (1983).
25. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26. [d. at 734.
27. 192 U.S.P.Q. (DNA) 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
28. [d.

29.
30.
31.
32.

632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
/d. at 990.
[d. at 993; see also Warner. Copyrighting Jewelry. 31 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 487 (1949).
Kieselstein-Cord. 632 F.2d at 993. In the same sense. a design on wallpaper "or a floral
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the court held that the Copyright Office implicitly considered the belt buckles in question to contain a copyrightable work of art. 33 .
III.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE SEPARABILITY TEST

As described in the House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976,34 for an
applied design to be copyrightable, the artistic features must not only be separate, but must also be capable of an independent existence. This separation
and independence can be either 'physical or conceptual. In either case, the test
for determining copyrightability of an applied design can be restated this way:
(I) It must be possible to perceive a fully functioning useflJl article, with its
basic, overall shape intact, which is able to exist even if one were to remove
certain features; and (2) those separate, artistic features must themseives meet
the Copyright Act's minimal standard of original creative expression. 35 Irrelevant to the application of this test are such factors as the aesthetic value of the
design, whether the shape could be designed differently, and the amount of
work which went into the creation 'of the design. 36
.
The Copyright Office now has more than thirty years experience in
applying the separability test. The test is both reasonable anct workable.
The task of differentiating between designs' protected by copyright law and
those unprotected is a difficult one in borderline cases. This, however,
would be true of any alternative test. The separability test has also functioned as a barrier to protection of indus~rial designs in general. As noted
in the 1976 House Report, industrial products-such as furniture, television sets, automobiles, appliances, and the like-which are at least in part
designed to be aesthetically pleasing, are not protected under the copyright
law by application of the separability test. 37
The separability test is criticized by some writers and designers because
the test works to exclude functional modern designs rather than to include
meritorious, artistic efforts. In the early development of the separability test,
the Copyright Office was more concerned with this drawback of the test than

33.
34.
35.

36.

37.

relief design on silver flatware" is considered separable. See H.R. REP. No. 1476. 94th
Cong .• 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
Kieselstein-Cord. 632 F.2d at 994.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
For example. the wavy pattern on the soles in SCOA Indus.• Inc. v. Famolare. Inc .• 192
US.P.Q. (BNA) 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) would not have been copyrightable even if considered conceptually separable from the shape of the useful article. since the wavy pattern
was not sufficiently original and creative. See ".R. REP. No. 1476. 94th Cong .• 2d Sess.
54-55. reprinted in 1976 US. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659.5667-68.
US. COPYRIGHT OFFICE. COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 505.05
(1984). Section 505.05 provides as follows:
Separability test: factors not relevant in determining registrability. In applying
the test of separability. the following are· not relevant considerations:
I) the aesthetic value of the design. 2) the fact that the shape could be designed
differently. or 3) the amount of work which went into the making of the design.
Thus. the mere fact that a famous designer produces a uniquely shaped food
processor does not render the design of the food processor copyrightable.
".R. REP. No. 1476. 94th Cong .• 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
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in recent years. Testifying in favor of the Design Protection Act of 1960, Mr.
Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights, agonized over the unfairness of the test
to modern functional design. In his testimony, Register Fisher stressed that
modern use of designs was being denied copyright protection. In his opinion, this was a completely illogical result. 38 Register Fisher's words contrast
sharply with the recommendation by the 1976 House Subcommittee to the
Copyright Office to incorporate the separability test in explicit statutory language.
Judicial acceptance of the separability test certainly has contributed to
its credibility. Time and experience have also allowed the Copyright Office
to become more assured in its application of the test. The fundamental issue
remaining is whether the copyright laws should be stretched to accommodate aesthetically pleasing designs, or whether an objective test, such as the
separability test, should be applied to foreclose copyright protection of most
designs. The Copyright Office has concluded that the latter course is correct
because of the statutory language in support of that position. 39 The practical effect of this approach is that most applied designs are not protected by
copyright nor are they effectively protected by the design patent law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Application of the separability test means that the basic design of any
utilitarian article is not protected by copyright. Products containing a twodimensional design-for example, floral pattern on dinnerware or
38. See Design Protection: Hearings on S. 2075 and S. 2852 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks & Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
81-82 (1960). Register Fisher's testimony read as follows:
What we are trying to do is take an artistic form of art or representation of
art, such as the Balinese dancers, and there we are issuing certificates [of copyright registration].
As the opposite extreme, the contemporary, modern use of the best
designs of often more beautiful art which is not representational, we are not registering. We think this is a wholly illogical position, frankly-I confess this in
open hearing-to say that on a piece of furniture an elk head on the back of a
bench is subject to registration because our grandfathers had elk heads on their
benches, and a modern contemporary design for a piece of furniture by the
Miller Co. of Michigan which represents the most modern, most beautiful
design is not registerable. Or similarly a picture on a plate which is of flowers
or forest or an animal is protected, but a more beautiful piece of Swedish or
Danish chinaware designed for example, by George Jensen, and which might
appear in a museum is not registerable.
We think this is a wholly questionable position. As a result, we are being
sued with increasing frequency, and there is a great deal of time and money in
my office and that of the Attorney General being spent in trying to sustain this
illogical line in the hope that we will be relieved of this by Congress. This is
what we are trying to do.
We don't like it a bit, and I spend much of my time, as the Librarian said,
on something which is really foreign to the basic purposes of copyright.
Id.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § lOl (1988).
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flatware-are generally protected, but only with respect to the two-dimensional design. The greatest impact of the separability test has been in the
case of the three-dimensional design of articles of utility. Relatively few of
these designs can pass the separability test, and virtually no modern, functional design can pass the test.
Finally, it is important to understand that the separability test is not
applied unless some part of the work can be classified as a useful article.
The separability test is never applied to works that fall within the traditional
concept of works of art-for example, paintings, sculptures, and graphic
prints-which have no purpose other than to be appreciated aesthetically.
At the same time, acceptance of an object for display in an art museum does
not make that object a work of art under copyright law. If the article has a
useful aspect within the meaning of copyright law, the separability test
would then be applied.

